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THE VARIETIES OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
DANIEL H. COLE*
“Comparative institutional analysis” (CIA) often is treated as a singular
approach to diagnosing and potentially resolving social cost problems (or
social dilemmas). In fact, the label represents a family of related but
importantly different approaches, based on the different conceptions of
“institutions,” as well as different processes or functions individual scholars
are attempting to describe and explain. This contribution to
a Festshcrift honoring Neil Komesar, the legal scholar most commonly
associated with the CIA methodology, begins by highlighting a myriad of
definitions of the word “institution,” offers a functional account of alternative
definitions of that term, and attempts to demonstrate the utility of alternative
approaches to CIA by comparing and contrasting the substantially different,
but equally effective, ways it has been employed in the works of Komesar
and Elinor Ostrom. The comparison yields a possible approach to reconciling
Komesar’s treatment of institutions with that of Ostrom’s fellow Nobel
Laureate, Douglass North.
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INTRODUCTION
The roots of institutional analysis extend as far back as Plato’s
Republic1 and Aristotle’s Politics.2 Modern variants of the approach have
a common antecedent in the German historical school of the first decade
of the twentieth century.3 However, most institutional analysis has not

*
Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, School of Public and
Environmental Policy, and Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis. The author is grateful to Peter Grossman, Neil Komesar, and Mike
McGinnis for helpful comments on drafts of this Article.
1.
See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Francis MacDonald Cornford trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (n.d.).
2.
See ARISTOTLE, Politica, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127 (Richard
McKeon ed. & trans., Random House 1941) (n.d.).
3.
See GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, GRUNDRISS DER ALLGEMEINEN
VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE (1904); Rudolf Richter, Bridging Old and New Institutional
Economics: Gustav Schmoller, the Leader of the Younger German Historical School,
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been comparative in nature. Scholars have often expressed preferences
for one institution (or set of institutions) over others, but without any
kind of scientific metric for comparing the social welfare implications of
alternative institutional arrangements.4 Ronald H. Coase himself
criticized the “Old Institutionalists,” including John R. Commons,
Thorstein Veblen, and Westley Mitchell, on precisely that ground, noting
that they amassed mountains of data, “waiting for a theory, or a fire.”5 It
was Coase who provided the first truly useful metric—transaction
costs—for comparing institutions, thereby setting the stage for a “New
Institutional Economics.”6 Alternative institutional arrangements could
finally be compared according to a consistent metric to determine which
would maximize social welfare (or the social product) by minimizing the
costs of transacting.
Even after Coase, as Neil Komesar so often has pointed out, many
scholars continued to engage in single institutional analysis, sometimes
despite claims that they were doing comparative institutional analysis
(CIA).7 Harold Demsetz’s famous 1967 article, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, is a case in point.8 He purported to compare
Seen with Neoinstitutionalists’ Eyes, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 567
(1996).
4.
Of course, scholars often advocated for some institutions over others, but
that was often a matter of personal, often ideologically based, preference rather than a
legitimate comparison of social welfare outcomes.
5.
Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 230 (1984) [hereinafter Coase, New Institutional
Economics]. On the other hand, Coase has also written that “we have less to fear from
institutionalists who are not theorists than from theorists who are not institutionalists.”
Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 194, 196 (1964) [hereinafter Coase, Regulated Industries]. It has been argued,
meanwhile, that Coase overstated the extent to which “Old Institutionalism” lacked a
theoretical foundation. See Victor Nee, The New Institutionalisms in Economics and
Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 49, 50 (Neil J. Smelser &
Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005).
6.
See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1, 2 (1959) [hereinafter Coase, Federal Communications]; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 5–6 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Problem of Social Cost]; Coase, New
Institutional Economics, supra note 5, at 230.
7.
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994).
8.
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347, 354–59 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Property Rights]. That
Demsetz engaged in single institutional analysis while purporting to engage in
comparative institutional analysis is ironic given his strong condemnation (just two years
later) of the “nirvana approach,” whereby an existing imperfect institutional arrangement
is compared with some “ideal norm.” See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency:
Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969). His Toward a Theory of Property Rights
exemplifies perfectly the “nirvana approach.”
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common-property regimes and (individual) private property solutions for
averting what Garrett Hardin, writing a year later, called the “tragedy of
the commons.”9 Demsetz was trying to explain why it is that the
institution of (individual) private property seems to arise in just about
every society at some stage in its socioeconomic development. Based on
highly unrealistic assumptions about political governance,10 Demsetz
found that effective common-property solutions are impeded by high
transaction costs.11 Therefore, he concluded, (individual) private property
becomes socially preferable.12 Having spent the bulk of the article
examining the transaction (or transition) costs of converting pre-existing
unregulated common-property systems into regulated common-property
systems,13 including the likelihood of strategic behavior (such as
holdouts), Demsetz made no effort to estimate the costs of converting
from a common-property regime to a private property regime. A more
realistic assessment would have compared the estimated costs (and
benefits) of complete privatization with the estimated costs of continued
management under an amended common-property regime.14
Coase’s truer followers, including Komesar, eschew such simplistic
and patently insufficient analyses in favor of the more difficult and
complex task of actually comparing the costs and benefits of alternative
institutional arrangements (including both property rights regimes and
regulatory instruments), which really is the only way of avoiding
ideology-based nostrums. So, for example, in his book Law’s Limits,
Komesar criticizes Richard Epstein’s approach to regulatory takings law
9.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244,
1247–48 (1968); Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 8.
10.
After studying the history of the emergence of family property rights in a
Canadian indigenous tribe, Demsetz posits a uniquely democratic tribe, for which any
changes to a pre-existing common-property regime that amount to open access for
individual members of the tribe must be agreed to by unanimous agreement of all tribe
members; any member who does not agree may continue harvesting animal fur under the
pre-existing rules. Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 8, at 351–54. As a consequence,
the transaction costs of transitioning from an unregulated common-property regime to
regulated access for tribe members could well be very costly, in part because of strategic
behavior driven by market incentives. Id. at 355. Even if Demsetz’s assumptions of (1)
unregulated access for tribe members under the existing regime and (2) a purely
democratic tribe operating pursuant to a rule of unanimous consent for rule changes were
not patently unrealistic, that still would not justify his lack of attention to the costs of
transitioning from the pre-existing common-property regime to a regime of individual,
private ownership.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 356.
13.
Id. at 356–59.
14.
This is not to say that Demsetz’s arguments about the virtues of private
ownership for reducing both negative externalities and transaction costs, compared to
alternative property/regulatory solutions are incorrect; it is just that his analysis is
insufficient to support that claim.
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for failing to adequately consider the costs of greatly expanding access to
the courts for aggrieved property owners versus the costs of failing to
provide broader judicial remedies. More specifically, Komesar explains
that Epstein (1) focuses on the wrong political malfunction, majoritarian
bias, when most such takings result (pursuant to theories of collective
action) 15 from minoritarian bias, which the “just compensation” clause is
not designed to ameliorate;16 and (2) neglects the supply-side constraints
that limit the ability of the judiciary to resolve more than a small fraction
of the regulatory takings claims that Epstein’s inclusive definition would
generate.17 Even if “[t]here is much to be said for an expansive vision of
the Takings Clause, in general, and of regulatory takings, in particular,”
Komesar believes that Epstein’s expansive regulatory takings rule would
require a “judiciary so massive that it would alter the basic character of
the judiciary,” leading potentially to a political backlash against the
courts.18 Komesar concludes that society, including, ironically, most
property owners, might well be better off with the legislative
malfunctions than under alternative judicial malfunctions that would
likely occur if courts were required more often to intervene between
governments and landowners.19
Whether or not one agrees (as I do) with Komesar’s conclusion, the
great virtue of his approach is obvious: it is not good enough to identify
an institutional malfunction (a type of social cost problem) and
recommend an alternative institutional solution that may also fail
(sometimes for the same reasons). This leads only to an institutional
cycling problem as market failures lead to purported government
solutions, which then lead to government failures, giving rise to calls for
market solutions. It is better to avoid this cycling problem by comparing
the expected costs associated with any recommended institutional
15.
See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 181 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS]
(discussing the distribution of stakes across a population); MANCUR OLSON JR., THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965)
(proposing rational individuals will not advance common group goals at the expense of
personal welfare unless coerced to do so); KOMESAR, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the
distribution of stakes across a population).
16.
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at 94–95. In such cases, just
compensation merely spreads the costs among taxpayers rather than focusing the costs on
the beneficiaries of the expropriation. As a consequence, it actually exacerbates existing
incentives for interest groups to engage in rent-seeking activity via government
expropriations.
17.
Id. at 91, 94–95.
18.
Id. at 91, 99.
19.
Id. at 106. For evidence that Komesar’s relative trust in the political process
as the least bad solution may be well placed, see, for example, Daniel H. Cole, Political
Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2007).
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solution with the observed costs of the alleged institutional failure.
Komesar’s recommendation of CIA is a direct outgrowth of Coase’s
injunction against the presumption that market failures automatically
warrant government intervention because we must also account for the
costs of likely government failures.20
Institutional analysis generally, and CIA in particular, are taught and
used not only by scholars in law and economics but across the social
sciences,21 which creates exciting interdisciplinary possibilities but also
significant difficulties, as variable meanings become attached to words
like “institution” and “organization” (among others).22 This Article is
about the already wide diversity of approaches to comparative
institutional analysis across disciplines, and the increasing need for a
common thesaurus (rather than a common dictionary) for
cross-disciplinary communication and learning about institutions and
their social-ecological consequences.
Part I of this Article examines the numerous ways in which CIA is
actually deployed across disciplines, with special attention to differential
definitions of common terms. Neil Komesar’s approach and definitions
will be compared with those of other social scientists, including Ronald
Coase, Douglass North, and Elinor Ostrom. Part II then focuses on
alternative approaches to CIA offered by Komesar and Ostrom not so
much to establish that one approach is preferable to another, but to
demonstrate that lack of complete agreement on vocabulary and
analytical variables is not an insufferable problem. As we shall see,
different definitions of common concepts, such as “institution,” seem to
be selected largely for functional reasons,23 based on the specific types of
questions a particular analyst is trying to understand and explain.
However, the use of variable definitions can create misunderstandings
and impede effective communication if scholars are less than clear about
how they define terms relative to the wider, cross-disciplinary literature.
The bottom line of this Article is that CIA is a very powerful, indeed
crucial, tool for policy making for social welfare,24 but one characterized
20.
21.

Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 194–95.
See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS:
IDEAS AND INTERESTS (3d ed. 2008) (presenting similarities and differences of
institutional theories).
22.
This is a point I made in an earlier review essay of Neil Komesar’s book,
Law’s Limits. See Daniel H. Cole, Taking Coase Seriously: Neil Komesar on Law’s
Limits, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 261, 263–64 (2004).
23.
Komesar admits a functional reason for his own definition of “institution.”
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 9. And, as we shall see, other
scholars’ definitions seem chosen to serve similarly functional purposes. See infra notes
26-44 and accompanying text.
24.
Even if one is not persuaded to go along with the somewhat extreme
institutional determinism of DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
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by great variation in design and use across the social sciences, and those
(largely functional) variations must be appreciated across disciplines in
order to maximize the tool’s value.
I. THE WORKING PARTS OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In this Part, I address how approaches to CIA differ across scholars
and across disciplines. Two elements are central to the variation we see
in CIAs: (1) definitions of terms, such as “institution” and
“organization,” which determine the focus or scope of analysis; and (2)
the evaluative criteria used to compare alternative institutions or sets of
institutions.
Before one can engage in any form of CIA, one must define (if only
implicitly) what is meant by an “institution.” Despite the fact that
institutional analysis (comparative or otherwise) has been with us for a
very long time—the term “institution” reportedly was first used by
Giambattista Vico in his 1725 book Scienza Nouva25—surprisingly little
agreement exists on the meaning of that rather ordinary-seeming term. In
fact, “institution” seems to have nearly as many definitions as definers.
Sometimes, the term is defined only implicitly. More problematically for
interdisciplinary understanding, some definitions are not compatible with
others. Here is a fairly representative sample (in no particular order) from
various social-scientific literatures.
Neil Komesar (law):
Institutions for me are large-scale social decision-making
processes—markets, communities, political processes, and
courts. I use the choice among these institutional processes to
clarify basic issues such as the roles of regulation, rights,
governments, and capitalism. These processes are alternative
mechanisms by which societies carry out their goals.26

FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012), no one today would
argue that institutions are anything less than very important contributing factors to social
welfare.
25.
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What Are Institutions?, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 1
(2006).
26.
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at 31. Komesar is, by his own
admission, not entirely consistent in his treatment of organizations as institutions. Id. For
example, he concedes that for functional reasons he treats some organizations, such as
labor unions and corporations, as actors rather than institutions, while acknowledging that
they might be, and sometimes are, treated under his rubric as institutions. KOMESAR,
supra note 7, at 10. This would have been problematic, had Komesar not been clear at the
outset about what he was including and what he was excluding from his CIA. Even so, he
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Ronald Coase (economics):
Contemplation of an optimal system may suggest ways of
improving the system . . . [and] it may go far to providing a
solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has
directed economists’ attention away from the main question,
which is how alternative arrangements will actually work in
practice. . . . Until we realize that we are choosing between
social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are
not likely to make much headway. . . . The kind of question
which usually has to be decided is, for example, whether the
administrative structure of an agency should be changed or a
certain provision in a statute amended. That is to say, what we
are normally concerned with are social arrangements and what
is economically relevant is how the allocation and use of
factors of production will change with a change in social
arrangements.27
Douglass North (economics):
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional
change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence
is the key to understanding historical change.28
Gustav von Schmoller (economics):
“[A] partial order for community life which serves specific
purposes and which has the capacity to undergo further
evolution independently. It offers a firm basis for shaping
social actions over long periods of time; as for example
property, slavery, serfhood (sic), marriage, guardianship,
market system, coinage system, freedom of trade.”
....

might have usefully offered a more definite, consistent analytical basis for determining
when organizations should be included versus excluded from the term “institution.”
27.
Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 195.
28.
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).
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[Organizations, then,] are the personal side of the institution.29

Vincent Ostrom (political science):
“[I]nstitutions are defined as systems of rule-ordered
relationships,”30 where “[r]ules are linguistic structures that
enable human beings to distinguish the realm of all possible
actions into those that are prohibited, permitted, and
required…. Rules thus establish constraints that allow for
predictability in human relationships, while leaving open a
range of possibilities to take account of other calculations that
impinge on human welfare.”31
Elinor Ostrom (political science):
Broadly defined, institutions are the prescriptions that humans
use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured
interactions including those within families, neighborhoods,
markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations,
and governments at all scales.
....
The opportunities and constraints individuals face in any
particular situation, the information they obtain, the benefits
they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about
the situation are all affected by the rules or absence of rules
that structure the situation.32
Susan Crawford and Elinor Ostrom (political science):
We use the broad term institutional statement to . . . refer[] to a
shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes,
permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both
individual and corporate). Institutional statements are spoken,
written, or tacitly understood in a form intelligible to actors in
an empirical setting. In theoretical analyses, institutional

29.
EIRIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 6, 7 (1998)
(quoting VON SCHMOLLER, supra note 3, at 61).
30.
VINCENT OSTROM, Conceptualizing the Nature and Magnitude of the Task
of Institutional Analysis and Development, in 2 THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HUMAN
AFFAIRS: ESSAYS ON COLLECTIVE, CONSTITUTIONAL, AND EPISTEMIC CHOICE 181, 191
(Barbara Allen ed., 2012).
31.
Id. at 190.
32.
ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 3 (2005).
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statements will often be interpretations or abstractions of
empirical constraints and opportunities.33
Elinor Ostrom (political science):
“Institutions” can be defined as the set of working rules
that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be
followed, what information must or must not be provided, and
what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their
actions. All rules contain prescriptions that forbid, permit, or
require some action or outcome. Working rules are those
actually used, monitored, and enforced when individuals make
choices about the actions they will take.34
Thorstein Veblen (economics):
[M]en order their lives by . . . principles and, practically,
entertain no question of their stability and finality. That is what
is meant by calling them institutions; they are settled habits of
thought common to the generality of men.35
[An institution is] a usage which has become axiomatic and
indispensable by habituation and general acceptance.36
C. Reinold Noyes (economics):
[T]he arrangements,
society . . . .37

the

practices

and

the

rules

of

33.
Sue E.S. Crawford & Elinor Ostrom, A Grammar of Institutions, 89 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 582, 583 (1995) (citation omitted). Crawford and Ostrom adopt this broad
definition of “institutional statement” to encompass all three of the general approaches
they find in the literature: institutions as equilibria, institutions as norms, and institutions
as rules. Id.
34.
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 51 (1990) (citations omitted).
35.
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION AND
OTHER ESSAYS 239 (1919).
36.
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN
RECENT TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 101 n.1 (1967); see also William T. Waller, Jr.,
The Evolution of the Veblenian Dichotomy: Veblen, Hamilton, Ayres, and Foster, 16 J.
ECON. ISSUES 757, 759 (1982).
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Walter Hamilton (economics):
I[nstitution] is a verbal symbol which for want of a better
describes a cluster of social usages. It connotes a way of
thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is
embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people.
In ordinary speech it is another word for procedure,
convention, or arrangement; in the language of books it is the
singular of which the mores or the folkways are the plural.
Institutions fix the confines of and impose form upon the
activities of human beings. The world of use and wont, to
which imperfectly we accommodate our lives, is a tangled and
unbroken web of institutions.38
Geoffrey M. Hodgson (economics):
[W]e may define institutions as systems of established and
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.
Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table
manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all
institutions.39
Masahiko Aoki (economics):
An institution is a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs
about how the game is played. Its substance is a compressed
representation of the salient, invariant features of an
equilibrium path, perceived by almost all the agents in the
domain as relevant to their own strategic choices. As such it
governs the strategic interactions of the agents in a
self-enforcing manner and in turn is reproduced by their actual
choices in a continually changing environment.40
Randall Calvert (political science):
[T]here is, strictly speaking, no separate animal that we can
identify as an institution. There is only rational behavior,
37.
C. REINOLD NOYES, THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY: A STUDY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, SUBSTANCE, AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY IN
MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 2 (1936).
38.
Walter H. Hamilton, Institution, in 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 84, 84 (Edwin R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932).
39.
Hodgson, supra note 25, at 2 (citation omitted).
40.
MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 26
(2001).
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conditioned on expectations about the behavior and reactions
of others. When these expectations about others’ behavior take
on a particularly clear and concrete form across individuals,
when they apply to situations that recur over a long period of
time, and especially when they involve highly variegated and
specific expectations about the different roles of different
actors in determining what actions others should take, we often
collect these expectations and strategies under the heading
institution.41
Everett C. Hughes (sociology):
(1) a set of mores or formal rules, or both, which can be
fulfilled only by (2) people acting collectively, in established
complementary capacities or offices. The first element
represents consistency; the second concert or organization.42
A. Allan Schmid (economics):
Institutions are human relationships that structure
opportunities via constraints and enablement. A constraint on
one person is opportunity for another. Institutions enable
individuals to do what they cannot do alone. They structure
incentives used in calculating individual advantage. They also
affect beliefs and preferences and provide cues to uncalculated
action. They provide order and predictability to human
interaction.43
W. Richard Scott (sociology):
Institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social
life.44
This is not the place for a detailed parsing of these various
definitions of “institution” (a comparative analysis of “institutions,” if
you will), but several points of differentiation are worth exploring. First,
41.
Randall L. Calvert, Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, in
EXPLAINING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57, 73–74 (Jack Knight & Itai Sened eds., 1995).
42.
Everett Cherrington Hughes, Institutions, in AN OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIOLOGY 283, 287 (Robert E. Park ed., 1939) (emphasis omitted).
43.
A. ALLAN SCHMID, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 1 (2004).
44.
SCOTT, supra note 21, at 48.
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observe that some social scientists writing about “institutions,” for
instance Elinor Ostrom, have adopted multiple definitions. She defined
the term somewhat differently in works she wrote at different times and
to different ends.45 However, as I explain later in this Article, Ostrom’s
various definitions, properly understood, are mutually compatible, and
also are compatible with Douglass North’s consistent and strict definition
of the term. The apparent differences among them are explained by the
different functions she intended the term to serve within the specific
analysis.
Important differences among several definitions of “institution” can
be dichotomized along one or both of two dimensions: inclusive versus
exclusive (of organizations) and static versus dynamic.46

45.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
46.
Because some listed authors are not entirely clear about these issues, not all
authors are listed on one side or the other of each dichotomy. The static versus dynamic
dichotomy may be partially vitiated by the recognition of some proponents of a dynamic
approach to institutional analysis, such as North, that some institutions, most notably
deep-rooted informal institutions, are very slow and difficult to change because of path
dependencies, vested interests, and other reasons. See generally NORTH, supra note 28
(illustrating and explaining the reasons for incremental institutional change).
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TABLE 1
INCLUSIVE VERSUS EXCLUSIVE DEFINITIONS

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“Institutions” Includes
Organizations
Komesar
Coase
von Schmoller
Veblen
Noyes
Hamilton
Hodgson
Hughes
Scott
Calvert

•
•
•
•
•
•

“Institutions” Excludes
Organizations
North
V. Ostrom
E. Ostrom
Veblen
Aoki
Schmidt

TABLE 2
STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC DEFINITIONS
“Institutions” Are Completely
Static/Immutable
• Veblen
• Hamilton

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“Institutions” Are Substantially
Dynamic
Komesar
Coase
North
von Schmoller
V. Ostrom
E. Ostrom
Noyes
Hodgson
Aoki
Schmidt
Calvert

Another obvious point of differentiation concerns the relative
influence of alternative definitions across the social-scientific literatures.
Douglass North’s seems to be the one most often mentioned throughout
the social sciences, though this remains an untested hypothesis; if true, it
is ironic because North’s definition deviates perhaps more than any other
from accepted usages of “institutions” in common parlance. For
example, North happens to be a Senior Fellow at the “Hoover
Institution,”47 which in his vocabulary is not an institution at all but an
47.
Douglass C. North, HOOVER INST., http://www.hoover.org/fellows/10069
(last visited Jan. 18, 2013).
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organization. To him (and to other scholars who exclude organizations
from their definitions of “institution”), organizations like the Hoover
Institution are “groups of individuals bound together by some common
purpose to achieve objectives.”48 As such, they operate pursuant to their
own set of institutions (corporate bylaws, organizational rules and norms,
church doctrine, etc.), and are strongly influenced by external societal
institutions, including both formal laws and informal social norms. As
actors in a wider society, organizations, in turn, may influence that
society’s institutional choices.
If North’s use of the term is the most prevalent (or, at least, the most
often cited among social scientists), even his fellow “New
Institutionalists” often deviate from it, as evidenced by the definitions
from Coase and Aoki.49 Coase, in fact, does not even use the term
“institution,” let alone the phrase “comparative institutional analysis,”
despite his well-deserved reputation for (1) providing a useful metric for
making institutional comparisons and (2) calling for comparative
analyses of alternative “social arrangements.”50 Coase’s use of the phrase
“social arrangements” implies a concern with choice of both rules and
organizational structures. He observes that we can change the structure
of an organization (such as a government agency), the rules under which
it operates, or both.51 Similarly, Komesar’s focus on legal
decision-making processes, including voluntary market contracting,
legislative enactments (via political processes at various levels of
government), and judicial rulings, implies a strong interest in
organizational choice.
Once a scholar has settled on a definition of “institutions” to serve
her or his purpose(s), the next major decision is to adopt a criterion or
criteria for comparison. Alternatives include (but might not be limited
to): (1) subjective value judgments based on ideological commitments or
beliefs; (2) net social welfare comparisons incorporating Coasean
transaction-cost analysis; (3) a Rawlsian “maximin” principle; (4)
Amartya Sen’s “capability approach;” or (5) net maximization of Harold
Lasswell’s eight “value terms” (including power, enlightenment, wealth,

48.
See NORTH, supra note 28, at 5.
49.
See supra notes 27, 40 and accompanying text. Another case in point:
North’s student Avner Greif incorporates organizations as part and parcel of his
institutional analysis. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 29 (2006).
50.
See Coase, Federal Communications, supra note 6; Coase, Problem of
Social Cost, supra note 6; Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5.
51.
See Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5, at 194.
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well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude).52 Both (3) and (4)
point in the direction of preferring institutions (or sets of institutions) that
relieve poverty, thereby increasing social opportunities for the worst-off
in society (which might not necessarily be inconsistent with social
welfare maximization).53 Among the first generation of Old
Institutionalists and many self-described libertarians, the first evaluative
criterion generally seems (to me at least) to be most common (which is
not to say that those who prefer the second or third criteria are devoid of
ideological bias—no one is). Among New Institutionalists who engage in
real CIA, the overwhelming majority adopt a social-welfare approach,
which requires attention to the likely effects of alternative institutional
arrangements on the costs of transacting (among other costs, possibly
including “demoralization costs” arising from institutional arrangements
that reduce incentives to undertake productive investments54).55 At least
one New Institutionalist, Elinor Ostrom, has cited Lasswell as an
important influence.56
The differences in definitions of the objects of analysis (institutions)
and the existence of alternative evaluative criteria might suggest that CIA
is not a single analytical approach but a family of approaches with points
of similarity and points of difference, which might or might not be in
need of standardization. However, the following Part argues for a
functionalist explanation of alternative definitions of “institution,”
according to which preferred definitions depend on the specific rule
choices and/or organizational choices the scholar is attempting to
understand and explain within his or her analytical framework. On this
view, the plurality of definitions of “institution” is not a problem in and
of itself, except to the extent it can impede communication between
scholars who use the term differently.
The problem of varying evaluative criteria is, I suppose, less
problematic. To the extent conclusions are based on ideological priors,
52.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES 18 (1971);
1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 377 (1992).
53.
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 152–54 (1971);
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).
54.
On “demoralization costs,” see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1214–16 (1967).
55.
E.g., ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 24; KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 105–09; KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 15, at
15–16, 20–21; NORTH, supra note 28; Cole, supra note 19.
56.
Elinor Ostrom, The Ten Most Important Books, 4 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK 36
(2004); see also Matthew Auer, Contexts, Multiple Methods, and Values in the Study of
Common-Pool Resources, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 215, 225 (2006).
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outcomes of analyses are essentially predetermined and actual
comparisons otiose. Evaluative criteria that offer potentially practicable
measures of consequences, such as some approach to maximizing a
social-welfare function or some other values, whether those of Rawls,
Sen, or Lasswell, are to be preferred; it seems reasonable that different
scholars might prefer different measures.57 All we can reasonably
demand is that scholars be as clear as possible not only about their
definitions of key concepts, such as “institution” and “organization,” but
also about the evaluative criteria they are using to compare outcomes
under alternative institutional arrangements.
II. THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
This Part compares Neil Komesar’s approach to CIA with that of
the late Elinor Ostrom. The purpose is not to suggest that one’s approach
is superior to that of the other, but only to explain that both approaches
are legitimate, given the social dilemmas (or social-cost problems) each
scholar is attempting to understand and explain, and to illustrate the
alternative kinds of approaches and assessments that CIA generally
permits.
In his book Imperfect Alternatives, Komesar unapologetically offers
a functional explanation of his approach to CIA:
Although, for the purposes of this book, I lump institutions
together into three general categories, market, political, and
adjudicative, there is no magic about these categories.
Institutions can be defined and aggregated in any number of
ways depending on the focus for study. The categories are a
compromise between conflicting analytical objectives—my
desire to show the broad spectrum of institutional choice and
my desire to examine law-related issues.58

57.
But see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002) (claiming that any approach focusing on equity or fairness in distribution, as a
maximand independent of social welfare, logically entails a commitment to policies that
would make everyone in society worse off). Following John Stuart Mill, who directly
connected notions of justice and utility, Kaplow and Shavell argue that distributional
concerns can be, and are most appropriately, subsumed within a more general social
welfare-based analysis. Id. After all, individuals express a “taste for . . . fairness.” Id. at
21; see also JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 5 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1979) (1863).
58.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 9 (emphasis added).
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The starting point for Komesar’s CIA is found in Coase’s 1964
discussion,59 which argued for equal attention to both government
failures and market failures, in recognition that all of our available
mechanisms for resolving social-cost problems are likely to fail, to
greater or lesser extents, in any particular set of circumstances.60
Consequently, our normative goal in making institutional choices should
be to choose those social arrangements that, in the circumstances, are
either least likely to fail or likely to fail the least. This is, in short, the
basis for all of Komesar’s assessments comparing market, legislative,
and judicial allocations of entitlements to resources. His CIA is, in
essence, Coase’s CIA, but applied to a somewhat different
institutional-choice set; they both include some organizations in their
definitions of “institution,” but they are concerned with different sets of
organizations (or decision-making processes). For Coase, the focus of
attention is on market versus firm versus government, by which he
means primarily legislative and administrative determinations of
allocations. For Komesar, the relevant choice set is markets (including
firms, in contrast to Coase), legislative bodies, and courts.
Komesar’s approach to “institutional” choice (others scholars might
well label it “organizational” choice) is decidedly Coasean.61 He
compares and contrasts markets, courts, and legislative bodies for
resolving various kinds of legal/social-cost conflicts (but with a
relatively heavier focus on courts), and reaches some surprising
conclusions. For example, as noted earlier, Komesar’s CIA of the
judicial doctrine of regulatory takings law in Law’s Limits leads him to
conclude that the game may not be worth the candle largely because of
supply-side constraints (numbers of judges and courtrooms) and
remedy-related problems. Specifically, “just compensation” is not an
appropriate remedy in cases where takings result from minoritarian
dysfunctions, that is, interest-group pressure, rather than majoritarian
bias, because it allocates costs to the wrong group of people and
compounds incentive problems that result in too many expropriations.62
Consequently, he expects that the legislative process may be the best
hope private property owners have, even if legislatures are also primarily
responsible for the problem in the first place.63
59.
See Coase, Regulated Industries, supra note 5.
60.
See id.
61.
By “Coasean,” I refer to Coase’s real concern with production and
allocation of entitlements to resources in the real world of positive transaction costs, as
opposed to the mythical world of what George Stigler (mis)labeled the “Coase theorem.”
See RONALD H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM THE MARKET
AND THE LAW 157 (1988); Coase, Problem of Social Cost, supra note 6, at 15–44.
62.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
63.
Id.
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More generally, Komesar’s approach to CIA has taught us a number
of useful lessons about the nature, scope, and direction of
institutional/organizational malfunction, including the important and
insightful observation that institutions tend to “fail together,” by which
he means that markets, legislative bodies, and courts often fail at the
same time and for the same reasons (if not to the same extent).64
While Komesar includes some (but not all)65 organizations in his
definition of “institutions,” Elinor Ostrom seems to exclude them entirely
from her definition. As noted earlier, Ostrom specified several
definitions of “institutions” in constructing an elaborate system (replete
with grammars, syntax, frameworks, theories, and models) for
diagnosing, analyzing, and resolving social dilemmas (or social-cost
problems).66 In one definition, she focused on the “institutional
statement” as a “shared linguistic constraint or opportunity.”67 In two
others, she adopted operational (as opposed to linguistic) definitions of
“institution,” both of which are variants of North’s conception68: (1) the
“working rules” that forbid, permit, or require actions by some actor or
group of actors (e.g., an organization) and (2) “prescriptions” that
structure social interactions.69 Ostrom’s various definitions are not at all
inconsistent; they reflect various functions the term “institutions” served
for Ostrom in different analytical and grammatical settings.
Ostrom and coauthor Sue Crawford adopted the linguistic definition
(“institutional statement”) in an attempt to construct an internally
consistent grammar for institutional analysis that could be used across
disciplines. The “working rules” definition was specified in Ostrom’s
most comprehensive exegesis of her Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework.70 And the definition of “institutions” as
“prescriptions,” which is hardly distinguishable from “institutions” as
“working rules,” appears in Governing the Commons, where she
examined common property regimes as institutional solutions to actual
common-pool resource problems.71 Each of the three definitions of
“institution” is connected inextricably to Ostrom’s IAD framework.
Thus, we need to understand something of her IAD framework to
appreciate her functional preference for a definition of “institutions,”
which excludes organizations from its ambit.
64.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 7, at 23.
65.
See id. at 9–10.
66.
See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
67.
See Crawford & Ostrom, supra note 33.
68.
Indeed, Elinor Ostrom quoted and explicitly embraced North’s definition of
“institutions.” OSTROM, supra note 32, at 179.
69.
See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
70.
See OSTROM, supra note 32.
71.
See OSTROM, supra note 34.
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The conventional IAD framework is described by the following
Chart72:
CHART 1
CONVENTIONAL IAD FRAMEWORK

The focal unit of analysis is the “action arena” (Ostrom came to
prefer the label “action situation,” which she used in the context of the
subsequently developed Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework)73
in which collective (cooperative or noncooperative) decisions are made,
resulting (or not) in collective action. Utilizing a structural system she
derived together with her husband Vincent,74 depicted in Chart 2 below,75
action arenas arise at three different levels of social choice: (1) the
constitutional-choice level at which the meta-rules of the game (the rules
for making rules) are chosen; (2) the collective-choice level at which the
operating rules of the game are specified in accordance with the
72.
ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 37
(1994). A slightly revised version of the same figure appears in Elinor Ostrom, Beyond
Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM.
ECON. REV. 641, 646 (2010).
73.
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability
of Social-Ecological Systems, 325 SCI. 419 (2009).
74.
See Larry L. Kiser & Elinor Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action: A
Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL
INQUIRY 179–80 authors’ n. (Elinor Ostrom ed., 1982); Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom,
Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration, 31 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 203, 211–12 (1971). For an application of the “three worlds of action,” see
OSTROM, supra note 34, at 52.
75.
Paul A. Sabatier, Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process, 24 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 147, 152 fig.2 (1991).
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meta-rules established at the constitutional-choice level; and (3) the
operational level, where social interactions allocate entitlements to
resources and result in (or fail to result in) collective action on social
dilemmas (or social-cost problems) in accordance with the social
“prescriptions” or “rules” established at the collective-choice and
constitutional-choice levels.76

76.

Id. at 151.
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At the operational level, an action arena may be a market, a court,
a media outlet, a legislative chamber, a tribal council, a neighborhood
meetinghouse, a church, a virtual locus in cyberspace, or a home. At the
constitutional- and collective-choice levels, the set of action arenas
usually excludes markets (although political arenas are often described
by public choice scholars as markets),77 but includes a wide variety of
other forums. Collective-choice level action arenas include Congress (for
all imaginable purposes, it is better described as an action arena, in which
the relevant actors are legislators, rather than as an actor itself or as an
organization for that matter),78 the respective houses of Congress,
legislative committees within each of those houses (wherein actors are
committee chairs, members, representatives of groups appearing before
them, etc.), party caucuses, parallel arenas at state and local levels of
government, and corporate and club boardrooms. At the constitutional
level, action arenas include (but are not necessarily limited to): Congress,
state legislative bodies, constitutional conventions, ratifying conventions,
town halls, and meetings at which articles of incorporation or corporate
bylaws are debated and adopted.
In any given action arena (or situation), participants (the actors) are
influenced (or incentivized) by many variables, including the biophysical
attributes of the resources (relative scarcity, boundary conditions,
rivalrousness of use, excludability, etc.) about which they are making
decisions; the attributes of their own community (e.g., population size
and relative homo- versus hetero-geneity, and various positions held by
different actors), and the collective-choice rules in use (that is, rules that
are actually enforced within the action arena). The outcomes of social
interactions, along with evaluations of those outcomes by social actors,
subsequently feed back into the variables that affect decision making. So,
failure to resolve a certain collective action problem, such as
conservation of a common-pool resource, in the relevant action arena
will impact on the biophysical attributes of that resource. And, if that
outcome is evaluated to be bad, based on some agreed criterion such as a
social-welfare function, it could (but might not) lead to institutional
change(s) at the collective-choice level. In addition, decisions taken at
various levels of choice can lead to changes in the composition (i.e.,

77.
See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 19–20 (1962);
Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS 285, 290–91 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 1994).
78.
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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attributes) of the community, as some members of the community, for
example, might vote with their feet, exercising the option of exit.79
Ostrom’s IAD framework has proven useful for developing and
testing theories and models of social interactions and their consequences
for both resource systems and institutions (or, put differently, for
coproduced SESs).80 To a substantial extent, its utility is derived from its
compatibility with a wide range of theories, models, and methods.81 It
can accommodate models of bounded as well as complete rationality; it
is particularly useful for creating and testing game-theoretic models, in
part because of its strong differentiation of actors and institutions. Game
theory, a method Ostrom found congenial because it provides predictions
that can be tested experimentally in both the laboratory and the field,
focuses on strategic decision making by actors in action arenas or
situations at all social-choice levels. Among those strategic actors are
organizations, which she defines as sets of “institutional arrangements
and participants who have . . . common . . . goals and purposes.”82 Their
actions are influenced by institutions—in Ostrom’s IAD framework, the
“working rules,” which in game theory are the (often unspecified) factors
that determine payoffs83—and the outcomes of their interactions (the

79.
See, e.g., ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21 (1970); Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 420 (1956).
80.
In recent years, Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis have shifted focus to an evolving outgrowth of the IAD
framework, known as the SES framework, which focuses equal attention on ecological
resource systems and human institutional systems, which greatly influence each other
and, in effect, coproduce social-ecological outcomes. See John M. Anderies et al., A
Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional
Perspective, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 18 (2004). The SES framework, which remains a work
in progress, is a more complex system based on nested sets of variables and subvariables,
which can be deployed in theories and models to explain, more accurately than the IAD
framework, the working parts of combined SES. Id.; see also Ostrom, supra note 73.
81.
In Ostrom’s methodology, frameworks are the highest, most generally
applicable systems. They provide the grammar and structure for constructing subsidiary
theories and testable models. See OSTROM, supra note 32, at 27–29.
82.
Margaret M. Polski & Elinor Ostrom, An Institutional Framework for
Policy Analysis and Design, WORKSHOP POL. THEORY & POL’Y ANALYSIS, 4 (June 15,
1999), http://mason.gmu.edu/~mpolski/documents/PolskiOstromIAD.pdf. But see
OSTROM, supra note 32, at 57 (“An organization is composed of one or more (usually
more) action situations linked together by prescriptions specifying how outcomes from
one situation become inputs into others. Organizations may be thought of as a tree or a
lattice with situations at each node.”). On this conception, “organizations” are neither
actors nor institutions, but constellations of action situations. This differs markedly from
North’s definition of “organization,” but is not necessarily inconsistent with his definition
of “institution,” which Ostrom embraces in the same work.
83.
See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the
Herder Problem Is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219 (2010)
TO
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“payoffs”) in turn influence institutions; but the actors are not,
themselves, institutions.
Ostrom’s IAD framework has not often been used for the normative
purpose of choosing among alternative institutions or sets of institutions
and organizations.84 That has been Komesar’s primary concern—to
choose and institutionalize the best or least bad (that is, lowest-cost)
means of dealing with some social-cost problem. Ostrom, by contrast,
was primarily interested in explaining institutional-choice situations and
predicting the success or failure of efforts to resolve social dilemmas
depending on a wide variety of biophysical and social variables. Her IAD
framework is, however, useful for comparative analyses because
“success” and “failure” (based on whatever evaluative criteria) are
relative concepts that depend on variables including (but not limited to)
institutional choices, which are perforce comparable. So, specific
applications of Ostrom’s IAD framework (using various theories and
models) provide information to decision makers in collective-choice
situations about which institutions or sets of institutions are more likely
than others to facilitate “good” outcomes (whether defined in terms of
resource conservation over time or a broader social-welfare function) in
various operational-level action arenas.
For example, a meta-analysis of dozens of specific case studies in
Governing the Commons allowed Ostrom to develop a set of eight
“design principles” for predicting the success or failure of that
institutional solution in other cases.85 The more closely conditions in the
action situation approximate Ostrom’s “design principles” (a phrase she
grew to dislike, but for which she never found a satisfactory alternative),
the more likely a common property regime is to succeed. Conversely, the
more the situation deviates from the “design principles,” the less likely a
common property regime is to succeed.86 Ostrom’s approach cannot
(criticizing game theorists who do not pay sufficient attention to the institutions that
structure the payoffs in games).
84.
Some of Ostrom’s work in the period just prior to elaboration of the IAD
framework was directly comparative. For instance, she conducted carefully constructed
(and subsequently replicated) large-n field studies comparing the performance of
consolidated (large) and polycentric (small and medium) municipal police departments,
finding that the then-standard assumption of economies of scale from consolidation of
small departments was generally unwarranted. See Elinor Ostrom & Gordon P. Whitaker,
Community Control and Government Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black
Neighborhoods, in IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF URBAN MANAGEMENT 303 (Willis D.
Hawley & David Rogers eds., 1974) [hereinafter Ostrom & Whitaker, Community
Control]; Elinor Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police
Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48 (1973).
85.
See OSTROM, supra note 34, at 89–102.
86.
For a large-scale empirical study supporting Ostrom’s “design principles,”
see Michael Cox et al., A Review of Design Principles for Community-Based Natural
Resource Management, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38 (2010).
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predict whether private-property or public-property/regulatory solutions
(however defined) necessarily would be any more or less successful in
cases where the “design principles” are generally satisfied, but on the
principle of subsidiarity implicit in the Ostroms’ polycentric approach to
social policy making, local solutions should be preferred to solutions
from more distant social choice forums, whenever the “design
principles” generally are satisfied (all else being equal).87 In many cases
at least, this presumption seems likely to be consistent with a Coasean
comparative transaction-cost analysis and, therefore, with Komesar’s
approach to CIA.88
Indeed, Ostrom’s approach might even provide a basis for bridging
the gulf that seemingly separates Komesar’s approach to CIA from
North’s approach. Specifically, although Ostrom (for the most part)
follows North’s restrictive definition of “institution,” her conception of
“action arenas” seems to match Komesar’s predominant concern with
decision-making processes as the focal points of analysis. For example, a
legal dispute in a courtroom is a decision-making process for Komesar
and an action arena for Ostrom. If we treat Komesar’s decision processes
as action arenas, it becomes possible to separate out institutions as the
rules that structure interactions and decisions in the judicial action arena,
as well as the outputs of decisions emerging from the judicial action
arena, rather than treating the adjudicatory process itself as an institution.
Even if Ostrom does not completely bridge the difference between
Komesar and North,89 her approach to institutional analysis cannot be
adjudged better or worse than any other, except on an inherently
subjective valuation of the utility of alternative approaches for

87.
See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 32, at 281–86 (addressing the comparative
advantages and limits of polycentric systems); Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831,
832, 837–38, 842 (1961).
88.
As Alexis De Tocqueville put it, “the collective strength of the citizens will
always be more powerful for producing social well-being than the authority of the
government.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 153 (Eduardo Nolla
ed., James T. Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2010) (1835). Tocqueville obviously
was not contemplating problems of externality or potential scale economies in
governance. The most efficient level of governance always depends on a variety of cost
factors, but Elinor Ostrom’s empirical research suggests that claims of scale economies in
governance are often exaggerated and sometimes false. See, e.g., Ostrom & Whitaker,
Community Control, supra note 84. See generally Richard C. Feiock, A Transaction Cost
Theory of Federalism (Fla. State Univ., Program in Local Governance Working Paper,
n.d.), available at http://localgov.fsu.edu/readings_papers/readings_miscellaneous.htm.
89.
Ostrom never applied her IAD framework to study legal action situations
per se. And it is not obvious how that framework might confront social choices among
alternative action arenas, which is of course of central concern to Komesar.
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understanding how humanly devised systems function,90 and the extent
to which that understanding facilitates “better” (defined in accordance
with some evaluative criteria) social choices among institutional
alternatives.
Komesar and Ostrom have both contributed greatly to the
development of CIA in their respective domains of scholarly interest.
Their approaches have provided immensely important and useful insights
not just for policy makers and policy analysts but for future generations
of scholars, who will continue to build on the foundations they have
established, whether by trying to consolidate and unify their approaches
or simply by extending and/or improving upon their respective
approaches to institutional analysis.
CONCLUSION
Neil Komesar has written that he has spent decades in a
“wilderness” (albeit a pleasant one), apart from mainstream legal
scholarship, pursuing his sometimes lonely quest to improve institutional
analysis for legal-policy choice.91 I suspect many, if not most, other
interdisciplinary scholars have similar feelings of alienation from their
home disciplines. What I have tried to show in this Article is that
Komesar actually has many friends among the various social sciences,
who have been working on more or less compatible approaches to CIA,
while Komesar has been plowing his lonely furrow in the legal academy.
An ever-increasing number of sociologists, international studies scholars,
anthropologists, economists, political scientists, public-policy analysts,
and even a few other legal scholars have, over the past decades,
developed and applied various approaches to CIA. Many universities
today offer courses in institutional analysis, using a variety of texts,

90.
In this context, a “system” may be defined as an equilibrium set of
(Northian) institutions and organizations.
91.
Neil K. Komesar, The Logic of Law and the Essence of Economics:
Reflections on 40 Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265. Interestingly, for much
of their careers Elinor and Vincent Ostrom felt alienated from their fellow political
scientists, who for a long time grossly underestimated the value of their research
approach and scholarly contributions. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric
Journey, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2010) (“My research interests took me down a long
and interdisciplinary path to the study of complex social-ecological systems—a path that
many colleagues in political science strongly criticized. . . . A political scientist was
expected to study the parliaments or bureaucracies of national or international regimes
and not the design, operation, and adaptation of rule systems at lower levels.”). They
founded the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in
1973, in part, as an interdisciplinary haven from the academic confines of their home
department (political science).
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including specialized textbooks and handbooks,92 which usually
incorporate a sizeable comparative element. Some of these books also
cross disciplinary boundaries and compare alternative approaches to
institutional analysis.93
The need remains for more and better communication among
scholars who use one or another form of CIA in various disciplines, not
necessarily to develop a single, unified theory and approach to CIA, but
at least to compare notes and learn from one another. It is long past time
that scholars from across academic disciplines started talking more with
one another to probe both common ground and differences in both goals
and methods.94

92.
See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010); SCOTT, supra note 21.
93.
See, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 21.
94.
Indiana University is home to a nearly forty-year-old center devoted to just
such interdisciplinary endeavors: the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis. On the importance and difficulties of interdisciplinary
cooperation, based largely on lessons learned over more than three decades of
collaboration and contestation at the Ostrom Workshop, see AMY R. POTEETE, MARCO A.
JANSSEN & ELINOR OSTROM, WORKING TOGETHER: COLLECTIVE ACTION, THE COMMONS,
AND MULTIPLE METHODS IN PRACTICE (2010).

